Opportunities and Challenges in Turkish and Chinese Bilateral Relationship

From VCG

Ph.D. candidate

Abstract

This article focuses on Turkey and China's bilateral relationship. In this context, the opportunities and challenges have been analyzed between the two countries. According to the findings, some economic opportunities such as the ‘Belt and Road project and problematic areas such as Uyghurs' problems and Syria issue are hot spots for this relationship. Besides, Turkey's membership in NATO also has been regarded to determine the axis of this relationship. The recent developments in the domestic and international areas in both countries forced to us reconsider this relationship in the context of a “new era” by multidimensional approaches. Another aim to reach in this paper is to analyze potential uncertainties to determine the strategic depth of this relationship. In this frame, primary sources and descriptive analysis method has been used for this research.

Keywords: Turkey, China, Global Economy, Foreign Policy, Xinjiang, Uyghur

1. Introduction

Turkey-China Relations has been getting closer since 1999.[1] In the last two decades, two countries build cooperation in a more institutionalized way. The ‘new era’ concept in this research refers to these last two decades. Although the development of relations is not stable, it always reached a better level than before. Two countries show the motivation to solve mutual trust and the rest of the problems. Based on last three decades, studies show that due to internal and external factors that it would longer time. Those motivations read as ‘axis shift’ by some academics and experts for Turkish foreign policy. But as explained above, it’s more like expanding cooperation without cutting ties with ‘old allies’.

With the 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping mentioned “Belt and Road” initiative(BRI), the two countries' relations have made very significant progress. Although there is a lot of uncertainty about BRI, two countries have big expectations from BRI. In recent years, two countries expected to promote economic and political development between the two countries.

Due to crises around the world and inefficient system of UN Security Council, Turkish President Erdoğan highlighted that the ‘World is Bigger than Five’ in the 73rd meeting of United Nations General Assembly in U.N. headquarters at 2016.[2] According to Erdoğan’s speech, “A U.N. Security Council that does not represent the whole world cannot facilitate justice.” [3] That shows Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the world system. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has a similar kind of discourse, which named ‘Community of Common Destiny’. It's hard to expect that China would give up its UN Security Council position to support Turkey’s thesis.

Turkey’s Eurasian identity, NATO identity, Turkey's great influence and historical relations on its surrounding geography may bring more opportunities for China's political and economic cooperation in Central Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Caucasus, and the Islamic world.[4]

China is an important country for Turkey. China is Turkey’s biggest import resources. Not only China’s membership of the UN Security Council but also its new technological developments, rising soft and hard power makes China a more and more important country to build ties with. China’s big market, a massive number of Chinese tourists around the world also another motivation for Turkey.

As there are some opportunities, there are some problems between the two countries as well. The priories, distrust and occurred problems make relations unstable. Due to two countries’ ‘conservative / orthodox governance’, those problems being covered or not mention as open as many countries.

According to Dr. Altay Alti, governments have been conducting many meetings to solve this problem. But the biggest problem is not only between two governments but also between the two nations. There is a lot of ‘disinformation’ going on among the two nations. Therefore, building close ties having a difficult time.[5]

“Although both countries pay more attention to each other, there is a certain difference and dislocation between the two. China pays more attention to the strategic value of Turkey in security, while Turkey pays more attention to the economic role of China, and it is also true that they still cannot trust each other.” [6] In other words, once former Prime Minister Davutoğlu was Foreign Minister, he mentioned Turkey needs to develop a democracy with EU standards, and produce in Chinese standards.[7] According to Dr. Altay Atli, Turkey’s improving relations with China do not result from an ideological preference.[8]

However, stable relations need stable political relations. Therefore, the two countries recently conduct many joints projects. BRI became a basement for many cooperation. Due to the current level of cooperation is in the ‘honeymoon’ period, by time Turkish-Chinese Relations will be tested.

2. Opportunities and Challenges Between Two Countries

Turkey - China Relations contains positive and negative factors. Two countries focus on cooperation, at the same challenge with some difficulties. In general, Turkey’s perspective, opportunities are China’s important role in the UN Security Council, Economic and Cultural Relations under BRI as well as Tourism ties with China and opportunities in the Chinese market. On the other hand, two countries face difficulties such as different opinions on Xinjiang Security Policies, China’s concerns about Uyghur diaspora in Turkey, Turkey’s NATO role as well as different political opinion on some international issues like Syria crisis.

China’s rapid economic development after joining WTO increased the number of economic cooperation between two sides. Stronger economies and numerous cooperation brought political dialogues and strategies. This part analyzes opportunities and challenges in political, economic, diplomatic, strategic, and security aspects.

Turkey and China have a promising cooperation space. Since ending the cold war, two countries have been trying to improve relations. In the last 20 years, the two countries rapidly improved ties in different fields like economy, military, security and people to people ties. The Belt and Road Initiative contains opportunities but at the same time, some people have negative concerns about the initiative. Two countries support each other thesis on different issues from time to time. China’s veto power in the UN Security Council is the major difference area. Although Turkey is not a member of the UN Security Council but most of the time two countries stand at different points. However, BRI plays a ‘bridge’ role between the two countries. Win-win economic interest leads two countries to cooperate and conduct more sociocultural ties. Another common area is Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Xinjiang with its cultural ethnic ties with Turkey is a ‘bridge’ between two countries. Although China is not willing any foreign power to interfering with Xinjiang, Turkey keeps focuses on the developments in there. Moreover, Uyghur people also have the motivation to have close ties with Turkey and Turkish culture. Due to high-security measures, many Uyghurs choose to leave China and move to Turkey. Because of high-security measures, some of the immigrants choose the illegal way to leave China. Moreover, some of those immigrants joined some radical organizations outside of China. Those developments are a conflict area between the two countries. The Chinese government suspect some links between those people and Turkey. Lastly, Turkey as a long term NATO ally has a big impact on its policies. Therefore, it's hard to expect to build closer ties with China on security and have alignment. Especially in the time that NATO’s ‘spiritual leader’ US is having ‘trade war’ and strategic rivalry with China.

The Turkish government plans to achieve the goal of becoming one of the world's top ten economies by 2023. Turkey needs to spend great effort to make its ‘dream’ real. Therefore, Turkey tends to build a multi-directional foreign policy, which leads Turkey to improve its cooperation with other countries. Like all states, Turkey and China want to gain political benefits from their mutual ties. It sometimes occurs as ‘win-win’ sometimes as ‘one-sided’ benefit.

3. Politic Opportunities and Challenges

From Turkey’s point of view, Turkey wants to see China as a political supporter in its ‘precious loneliness’ against its western allies. Since China is one of the most influential members of the UN Security Council, Ankara wishes to strengthen its political ties with Beijing.[9]

When President Erdoğan was Prime Minister, he mentioned that he supports the development of Turkish Chinese relations under mutual respect and win-win relations in 2013[10] Next year, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer mentioned that Turkey needs to diversify its relations in different fields with China in 2004.[11]

In 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan mentioned about Turkey-China Relations under the structure of the relations with ‘West’. Erdoğan underlined that rising powers like Russia and China are not an alternative to Turkey’s institutionalized ties with the European Union and the United States.[12]

As Turkey’s current ambassador to Beijing, Abdülkadir Emin Önen, stated Turkey does not consider China as an alternative to the United States or the EU. Turkey’s goal is to develop win-win relations with China. [13] According to a high-ranked Turkish government official, Turkey cannot ignore its ties with its western allies, all the Turkey’s national problems solution not in the east but west.[14]

The two countries consider the other side in a different way. In addition, “although both countries pay more attention to each other, there is a certain difference and dislocation between the two. China pays more attention to the strategic value of Turkey in security, while Turkey pays more attention to the economic role of China, and it is also true that they still cannot trust each other.” [15] That causes mutual distrust for each other. Moreover, According to one speech analysis of Turkish parliament members in the last 20 years (1999-2019) on China, parliament members talked two major areas; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Turkey’s Foreign Trade with China.[16] Those researches give us ideas about how the two countries see each other. As a result of mentioned Turkey’s military actionsin northern Syria, the relationship between Turkey and its Western ally has become increasingly unstable and strained.[17] In this sense, China’s support is crucial for Turkey.

For example, when Turkey conducted ‘Peace Spring Operation’ against PKK/YPG, China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang calls Turkey to stop military action. He also highlighted that Turkey’s military action may cause ISIS to rise in the region again.[18] China Daily editorial reported as “The situation in Syria risks being plunged into a new round of chaos and conflict that may cause a humanitarian crisis after Turkey launched a broad assault against Kurdish fighters in the north of the country on Wednesday.” [19 ]Whereas, President Erdoğan and President Xi have talked about cooperation on terrorism in July 2019.[20]

On the other hand, Turkey is missing the point that China strictly following its ‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ policy. That contains; Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity(互相尊重主權和領土完整), Mutual non-aggression(互不侵犯), Non-interference in each other's internal affairs(互不干涉內政), Equality and mutual benefit(平等互利), Peaceful coexistence(和平共處).[21] China, based on those principles adopts the stance of 'non-interference' other countries' internal affairs.

Although Turkey is welcome different political ideology and parties, there are some radical left political movements which conduct violent actions. One of them is the Maoist Communist Party of Turkey (MKP). Though it is not linked with China, I believe that is cause antipathy toward China and it’s one the reason why Turkey does not approach China in the political aspect.[22]Although China already stops ‘exporting revolution’ but local sympathizers are taking self-action under those ideologies.[23] Especially in the last 4 years, Turkish Security Forces conduct many operations against MKP.[24] For example, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said that “MKP was completely removed from the countryside in Counter-Terrorism Workshop in 2018.[25]

Moreover, Turkey’s Uyghur policy may push China to counter back with some other minorities like Kurds. People's Democratic Party (HDP) which also knows as it supports to Kurdish separation movement invited to visit China by the Chinese Communist Party in 2015.[26] Although China follows non-intervention foreign policy and follows ‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ policy, China does not recognize PKK (Kurdish Worker Party) as a terrorist organization. However, China has expressed respect for Turkey’s territorial integrity and shown its strong support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK in recent state visits.[27] But China’s invitation to HDP has shown that China may use the ‘Kurdish card’ as a pressure tool against Turkey. On the other hand, HDP has closer ties with western countries. It’s known that

one of the HDP Parliament members criticized China on the human rights of Uyghurs.[28]

What is more, Turkish government had more sensitive attitude on Uyghurs after the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) and JDP build cooperation after the 2018 elections. NMP’s support for JDP is essential. NMP’s pro-nationalist Uyghur attitude would give JDP pressure to have more balance relations with China. However, the ruling party JDP and its partner NMP have a more balanced attitude toward China. In July 2019, the main opposition party RPP and Good Party proposed to have research about Uyghurs but the resolution. Due to the lack of support of the ruling party JDP and its partner NMP, it didn’t pass. That shows how the ruling party tries to hold a more balanced policy toward China.[29]

In the following pages, the paper mentioned about some diplomatic protests against China made by the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Those kinds of the decision have the influence of cooperation between NMP and JDP. It’s known that NMP follows nationalist policies toward Uyghurs and Xinjiang. Before JDP and NMP cooperation started, a group of NMP members attacked Korean tourist by mistaken as Chinese.[30]

Furthermore, JDP is losing the public support year by year. Especially the last two elections show that the rate of the support decreased.[31] . It shows that the JDP government without the support of the NMP cannot stay in power. The rest of the effective opposition parties, like the Republican People's Party (RPP) or Good Party all, have western-oriented policies and they have a clear stance against China. Those parties are criticizing JDP’s close ties with China.[32] Under this circumstance, it’s possible to say that in the case that the new government comes to power, Turkish-Chinese Relations would not be close as now. But it's important to remember that economy is an important motive that shapes policies. China as the second-largest economy in the world cannot ignore by any country.

In the following years, Turkey was about to purchase Chinese long-range missile defense system HQ-9 which worth $3.44 billion.[33] However, this project canceled due to various reasons. After Turkey’s cancelation decision, many experts commented as NATO’s pressure. Because The US and NATO reacted to the negotiations with China.[34] That’s one of the biggest concerns for China about Turkey’s sincerity on Turkish-Chinese Relations.

In 2010, despite the opposition of most NATO countries, Turkey invited the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Air Force, to participate in the ‘Anatolian Eagle’ military exercise in Turkey. It was the first time that the PLA conducted a military exercise with a NATO state.[35] This indicates that military relations between China and Turkey have promoted political relations. The same year, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Turkey and bilateral relations elevated to the level of ‘strategic cooperation’.[36]

Two countries give importance to public diplomacy. Although two sides stand on different sides on Libya intervention in 2011, Turkey helped Chinese citizens who live in Libya; which had a positive impact on bilateral relations.[37] That shows that two sides always open the dialogue doors and spend effort on it.

Cooperation on technology also improved in the last decade, Turkey's first earth high-resolution observation satellite Gokturk-2 launched from China on December 18, 2012. In the same year, Turkey became a “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO).[38] Turkey’s partnership with SCO understood as ‘axis shift’ by some experts. But as mentioned above, SCO is no alternative to the EU.[39]

The Coup Attempt on July 15, 2016, played a ‘litmus paper’ role in bilateral relations. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Ming has visited Turkey to show their support after the coup attempt. It brought a positive impact on relations between the two countries.[40] Same year Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Turkey. That even created sympathy for China among Turkish nationalists and conservative people.

Under Turkey-China Foreign Ministers Dialogue Mechanism framework, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu to China and two sides talked about establishing a Turkish-Chinese University.[41] Although especially 2016 seems a very fruitful year for both sides, the Chinese government still being suspicious of many things like Turkey’s policies in Syria, Uyghurs, etc. For example, 15 Turkish tourists who traveled to China detained at the Urumqi airport by the Chinese police and they were not allowed to enter the country.[42]

In 2018, The Minister of Culture and Tourism, Numan Kurtulmus, visited Chengdu to attend the 22nd General Meeting of the United Nations World Tourism Organization. During his visit, two sides signed to establish the Yunus Emre Institute in China.[43] Yunus Emre Institue is a foundation that promotes Turkey, the Turkish language, its history and culture, and art; it improves the friendship between Turkey and other countries. [44] Currently, Turkey host 4 Confucius Institute in Turkish universities, unlikely Turkey does not have a single institute in China. The main reason is China’s strict regulations on those kinds of institutes.

The same year, the Turkish Presidency’s Directorate of Communications organized panel under the name of “Turkey and China: Prospects for Long-Term Cooperation” in Beijing and Shanghai.[45] Moreover, in 2018, Turkey started ‘Chinese Education Programs’ in Public Security University in China.[46]

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee member and the Sha'anxi Province Party Secretary Hu Heping visited Turkey under invitation of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in November 2019. During Hu’s visit, he met with Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) deputy president Sadi Bilgiç and Justice and Development Party Deputy Chairman Cevdet Yilmaz. [47] Two sides held “The ruling party dialogue and cooperation” conference. Hu joint opening ceremony of Xi'an-Ankara-Prague Trans-Caspian Train and mentioned about the importance of two-sided cooperation. [48]

During the COVID-19 outbreak, the two countries started to do public diplomacy. The first step came from Turkey. About the donation Head of the Press Office of the Chinese Embassy, Xie Xinxing said that “The Turkish side took a humanitarian stance”. In total, Turkey sends it a thousand biological hazard suits, 93,500 filter masks, 500 medical protective glasses,10 thousand medical equipment. [49] Moreover, Istanbul Grand Airport Company (IGA) donated $120,000 worth/ 3 tonnes aid to Beijing, Daxing, Chengdu and Shanghai airports.[50]

As a return, China responded via ICBC Bank. ICBC Bank announced that it's going to donate medical equipment worth 100 thousand dollars. The donation includes 1,200 protective clothing, 100 pairs of protective glasses and 3,000 masks. [51] On April 4, 2020, Shanghai Municipal People’s Government donated a test kit to Istanbul.[52]

President Erdoğan had a phone call with Chinese President Xi on April 8, 2020. Two sides talked about cooperation on COVID-19 and bilateral relations. Two leaders expressed their support and goodwill to each other. [53] Following this phone call, two ministers of foreign affairs had a phone call on COVID-19 after 2 weeks. Minister Wang Yi, emphasized that under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Erdoğan, two countries overcome the pandemic. He mentioned that next year is going to be the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Turkey and China and two countries work together on mutual trust and mutual support in the following years.[54]

Lastly, China’s aid packages to Armenia became an issue between the two countries. The phrase used on outside of the packages was “May Our Friendship Higher than Mountain Ararat and Longer than Yangtze River”. Ararat Mountain is located in Turkey and Ararat Mountain is an icon by the so-called “Armenian irredentism” movement. Turkish Foreign Ministry demanded the Chinese Ambassador for clarification about the message on aid packages sent to Armenia. China's Ambassador to Ankara Deng Li said their aid packages to Armenia were prepared by a local authority. Although China is always careful with its diplomatic actions. It would not expect such a diplomatic mistake from China.[55]

4. BRI and Economy

According to World Bank, BRI may reduce travel times along economic corridors,increase global trade, increase income around the world and may lift 7.6 million people from extreme poverty. Since currently BRI is mostly about infrastructure projects, therefore BRI contains risks like debt risks, governance risks (corruption and procurement), stranded infrastructure, environmental risks and social risks. [56]

Turkey as one of the key countries along with the BRI countries; may benefit and face risks of BRI. Chinese investment gradually increasing in Turkey. According to the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK), Turkey-China Business Council President T. Murat Kolbasi China aims to double its investment in Turkey by 2021. [57]

About those developments, China Consul General Cui Wei said that “China and Turkey are together on BRI for 5 years. In these 5 years, total trade volume has reached $ 100 billion. Chinese investments in Turkey had increased 120 percent, today, more than 1,000 of our Chinese company operating in Turkey. Currently, Bank of China and ICBC Bank operates in Turkey. I believe those developments will continue” in Turkey-China Trade and Investment Seminar in March 2019.[58]

According to World Bank Economist Michele Ruta, there are three opportunities and three risks of the Belt and Road Initiative. Opportunities are tremendous size and scope (1), large unexploited potential (2) and improving connectivity (3). Risk is Policy barriers create thick borders (1), Risks involved with major infrastructure projects (2) and Macro risks (3).[59]

From China’s perfective, China wants to receive Turkey’s support on its BRI initiative. Turkey’s geostrategic position in the center of Eurasia and the Middle East is one of the key places along with the BRI initiative. Moreover, Turkey is the most stable and strong country in its geography. Turkey’s support on BRI makes other developing countries more interested in BRI, therefore China gives big importance to Turkey’s support on BRI.

“Turkey as a member of the OECD and the G20, and a dialogue partner of the SCO. Besides, Turkey is a member of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In this sense, Turkey’s position is of utmost importance for China to implement the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’. [60] China is the second-largest economy in the world since 2010.[61] Turkey wants to establish good relations with China for many reasons. In terms of economy, Turkey has the largest foreign trade deficit with China. Turkey imports a large number of products from China, but when Turkish products enter the Chinese market, they face many formalities problems. Therefore, Turkey has a low export volume of export to China.

Turkey had $ 2,2 million exports and $17,1 million imports in its trade with China in 2010. After 5 years, in 2015, Turkey had $ 2,4 million exports and $24,8 million imports in its trade with China. Last year, Turkey had $ 2,5 million exports and $18,4 million imports in its trade with China. Those numbers show that there are massive trade deficits between two countries and those deficits are getting wider by years. The reason why it decreases in 2018 and 2019 is that Turkey’s weakening economy. 2020’s data only contain the data until April, therefore the number is still far away to show the current situation, but it expected to be lower. There are two reasons behind prediction; the first one is Turkey’s weakening economy and the second one is the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on the global economy.

Currently, China has become Turkey’s largest trading partner after Germany and Russia.[64] Although China is the third biggest trading partner of Turkey due to the huge deficit the Turkish government is trying to balance the import-export rate. Turkey’s top 10 export markets are as follows; Germany, UK, Italy, Iraq, US, Spain, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Israel in the last 4 years. China ranked as 16th country. Turkey’s top 10 import markets are as follows; Russia, China, Germany, US, Italy, India, UK, France, Iran, and South Korea.[65] As seen in this ranking, there is a huge gap between Turkey’s import and export.

On the one hand, The EU, in general, holds 50 percent of Turkey’s exports with $ 84 billion in 2018. In other words, the EU ranks top in Turkey’s total exports.[66] In 2019, the share of the EU was 48.8 percent despite the Brexit.[67] In 2020, this ratio reaches 50 percent again. [68] It’s shows that EU is still the most important trading partner. On the other hand, China was listed as the second-biggest import market but China does not list in the 10 top export market in 2019.[69]

Having said that, some economy experts warn about BRI. Due to the negative results of BRI, some countries like Sri Lanka and Cambodia faced the ‘debt trap’.[70] Many analysts are warning that a certain number of developing countries under the risk of ‘debt trap’. Therefore, this situation may lead some groups in Turkey to be more suspenseful about BRI.

Then again, after recent economic turbulence in Turkey, unlikely western investment, most Chinese investments choose not to leave the Turkish market. Although, EU holds the major chart of Turkish export; China with huge deficits has big potential. Therefore, the Turkish government is trying to attract more Chinese investment. A Turkish diplomat who had working experience in China says “Most efficient quick way is not entering the Chinese market, China already production most of the good that they need, therefore we need to attract more investment from China.” [71] In this way, Turkey may close the deficit with China at the same time hold the national economy alive. But the mentioned risk remains for the future.

In this sense, Turkey already receives many Chinese investments. It’s very like that those investments will rise and will be extended into various areas in the future. For example, at September 2019, two Chinese companies announced their Thermal Power Plant investment to the southern part of Turkey. The project, with a total investment of 1.7 billion U.S. dollars is the biggest Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) to Turkey.[72] By the end of the year, a Chinese consortium announced that purchase of 51% percent of the third and biggest bridge of Istanbul, which located between Asia and Europe.[73] As the last example, Turkish Presidency, Communications Director Fahrettin Altun released a promotional video of the ‘Canal Istanbul’ project in Chinese in January 2020.[74] ‘Canal Istanbul’ is the current government’s one of the projects which planned to have a canal between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. Those kinds of attempts show Turkish governments' motivation toward Chinese Investments. For instance, after the Syrian War, good relations with the Syrian government will help Chinese companies to have more advantages than other countries. At this point, China may invest in sectors like the cement sector and other infrastructure-related sectors. Turkey’s border cities may attract Chinese investments.

Especially due to unstable relations with EU countries, Turkey economically had closer ties with China. Especially, after at 2018 Turkish currency and debt crisis; Minister of Energy Berat Albayrak announced a $ 6 billion loan from China. In the same year, Turkey announced that Turkey will receive $ 89 million of loans from China for gas projects.[75] On March 26, 2020, The Turkey Wealth Fund (TWF) and China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation have inked a memorandum of understanding. The Chinese side agreed to provide $5 billion support.[76]

Turkey and China also cooperate with technology transferring like nuclear energy plants. So far, Turkey only has 2 nuclear plants; those are building by Russia and Japan. The third one is still on the table, most probably that China is going to be the third country to build the third nuclear plant.[77] In the past, there is some example of similar cooperation between the two countries. One of the most symbolic ones is the Edirne-Kars High-Speed Railway project.[78]

Moreover, Turkey declared its ‘Asia Anew Initiative’ in August 2019 by Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. He pointed Turkey’s historical ties with the region and current cooperation as well as future possibilities between Turkey and Asian countries. He said that “We see that the power of economy is heading from the West to the East and Asia has started to emerge as the center of power”. [79] To overcome, suspicious comments of allies, he underlined that “foreign policy, Çavuşoğlu said: “We are a member of NATO and the European Council. We are part of the European law and security system.” He pointed out that it’s not an “axis shift.” [80]

Turkey and China held “Turkey - China Business Forum” on November 5, 2019, in Turkey. TÜSİAD Secretary General and Board Member Bahadır Kaleağası said: “In the era of enormous technological revolution, we are rapidly entering a new era in the global economy. It's possible to establish more partnerships in areas like digital technology, energy, transport infrastructure, and tourism.” After the Business Forum, two sides held panel discussion named “China Economic Relations in Light of Turkey Belt and Road Initiative” [81] .

For example, in the tourism sector, China has the biggest potential. Turkey as one of the biggest tourist destinations in the world may enjoy the benefit of Chinese tourists. Currently, Chinese tourists ranking first as most spender among other countries.82 For example, Chinese tourists spend $130 billion overseas in 2018.[83] According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, China is the world's fastest-growing tourism market.[84]

By the increasing number of tourists, Turkish Airlines expanded its flights. Currently, Turkish Airlines launches flights to 6 cities in Mainland China.[85] Besides the big number of tourists, many Chinese go to invest in real estate in Turkey. Foreigners who invest $500,000 in Turkey, deposit $500,000 in Turkish banks or buy real estate worth $250,000 acquire the right to lifetime citizenship.[86] That started to attract many Chinese investors. Those investments expected to help the Turkish economy.

China International Publishing Group (CIPG) and Turkey's Turquoise Media Group conducted a meeting about the 7th year of their cooperation. The main theme was “Focus on the Eurasian Continent”. Culture and Tourism Minister Nuri Mehmet Ersoy, Turkey Exporters Assembly President Ismail Gulle, CIPG President Zhanyuan, Turkuvaz Media Executive Committee Member, and Turquoise Media Magazines General Manager Jasmine Gebeş, China Today Journal's President Baomin Hu and China Consul General Cui Wei attended the opening of the meeting. Two-sided talk about cooperation in many different fields such as media, culture, tourism, and economy.[87]

Turkey Exporters Assembly (TIM) President Ismail Gulle said that “If we want to shape today and our future, Eurasia should be more focused on mutual cooperation. Under the win-win principle framework, we need to focus on many projects.” [88]

On November 9, 2019, the first train that departed from China arrived in Istanbul. The train passed the Marmara tunnel which connected Asia and Europe below the Bosphorus. It was a very important step for Turkey and BRI Relations. Turkey’s geographic position is providing the shortest rail link between Europe and Asia. Therefore, Turkey has massive potential under BRI. [89] The same month, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu highlighted that importance of the EU or Europe has started to decrease, “Europe is on the decline and Asia is on the rise.” [90]

Last summer, China’s Central Bank made a $1 billion cash infusion into the Turkish economy in June 2019.[91] This amount helps the Turkish economy to ease economic pressure. Another similar development happened in 2018, Treasury and Finance Minister Berat Albayrak announced that the Chinese Bank, ICBC provided a $3.6-billion loan package for the Turkish energy and transportation sector.[92]

In September 2019, Turkish held 88th İzmir International Fair. China invited as an honored country. Trade Minister Ruhsar Pekcan remarked that “The two most important countries of the G20 platform, Turkey and China, are far below their potential. The cooperation between Turkey, the most dynamic economy of Europe, and China, the global power, will contribute to the economies of the Middle East, Balkans, and Europe.” [93]

Lastly, the ‘trade war’ between China and the United States, effected global production networks around the world. From the Turkish-Chinese Relations point of view, this situation both contains risks and opportunities. By the trade war, international and Chinese companies may flood to the Turkish market. It’s definitely a chance for Turkey. On the other hand, Chinese investment in Turkey would create closer economic ties between the two countries. But leaving foreign investment from China would have negative effects on the Chinese economy. Especially, due to COVID-19 in China, Turkey is becoming an alternative supplier in many different sectors such as Chemistry, Leather, Textile, Textile machine, Furniture, Tourism, and Shipbuilding. [94]

5. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)

Turkey and China introduce Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) as a friendship bridge between the two countries. Since 2000, when two sides talk about Xinjiang, they always mentioned about ‘bridge’ role of Xinjiang. [95] However, two governmentsintroduce Uyghurs as one of the most important communication bridges between China and Turkey, but in reality, it's being a ‘sensitive’ issue rather than a communication channel.

China is also a victim of separation movement and suffers from violent incidents for a long time. What’s more, radical organizations like The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement(ETIM) which also recognize by Turkey as a terrorist organization, possibly have ties in Turkey. [96] At this point, China wants to cooperate with Turkey to fight against separatist movements.

Due to Turkey’s ethnic and religious connection with the Uyghur people, Turkey time to time holds a more sensitive attitude toward the movements and human rights issues. According to a Turkish Diplomat, like many countries, public opinion is one of the key factors that drive foreign policy in Turkey. “Sometimes it’s the same for Turkey towards Uyghurs,” he said.[97]

“Some Turkish scholars use the term ‘East Turkestan’ as a regional name, some have even identified it as a ‘state’, which has caused discomfort and even anger in China. Therefore China has to be suspicious about Turkey’s sincerity.” [98]

On the other hand, the Uyghur diaspora in Turkey quite influences on Turkish society and politics. Especially, conservative parties have open support to Uyghur separation movements.

The Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit confirmed about minority issue and said that the Turkish government attach great importance to China's territorial integrity after returned from his China visit in 1998. [99]

When Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited to China in 2017, he highlighted that ‘We will never allow any activities against China in Turkey. ‘We will take measures to eliminate any media coverage against China.’ [100] That shows that the Turkish government willing to remove misunderstanding and show its support to China’s unity. A similar kind of comment came from President Erdoğan in 2019; ‘We will never allow the disintegration and fragmentation of China’.[101]

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu clearly declared his statement on the human right issue in Xinjiang and Turkey’s position on the issue in November 2019. He mentioned that some countries use this issue as a way of giving China pressure. He said that “we are not going to be like them, but we cannot ignore the facts.” [102]

Turkey and China have signed mutual extradition of criminals’ agreement in 2017.[103] The detail of the agreement has not released to the public. According to Washington D.C. based journalist Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, this agreement target Uyghurs in Turkey.[104] But Turkey's Ambassador to Washington Serdar Kılıç has declined this claim.[105]

Due to the ‘unpleasant’ attitude of Turkey toward China’s ‘Uyghur issue’ under President Erdoğan’s leadership (2003-Present). In 1995, when he was Istanbul Mayor, he named a park ‘Isa Yusuf Alptekin Park’. Isa Yusuf Alptekin (1901-1995) is the leader of the Uyghur independence movement. After Erdoğan’s decision about the name, China gave pressure to Turkey on the name. Erdoğan’s response was “Had not only the Chinese, but the entire world attempted to pressure us we would not change the name of the park. We, the mayors of Istanbul, believe that to change the name of the park would insult not only Turkey but all Turkic people of the world.” [106] Moreover, When Erdoğan was Prime Minister in 2014, he announced that Turkey saved 200 Uyghurs from execution in China.[107]Therefore, this situation became the reason that Chinese government distrust about Erdoğan’s credibility on Xinjiang. As mentioned above, once, when The Former Turkish Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan describe government measures after ‘Urumqi 7/5 Incident’ as ‘massacre’ against Uyghurs. President Erdoğan’s party JDP PM, Ahmet Yıldız criticized China about internment camps in Xinjiang. He mentioned that the government conducts ‘persecution’ on Uyghurs under “fight against terrorism”. [108]

Moreover, some Chinese scholars suspect about link between ‘separation’ movement and Turkish government effort. In this context, some Chinese scholars claimed Turkey as a center of separative movements in China. Turkish government gives big number of scholarship to Uyghurs and give Pan-Turkism lectures to those students from Xinjiang.[109]

However, Turkey and China hold a distinct opinion on Uyghurs. Especially, Uyghur diaspora around the world. The Chinese government has long been dissatisfied with the anti-China activities of the Uyghur diaspora and nationalist circles in Turkey.[110] When Turkey is approaching the mentioned issue from humanitarian and freedom of speech angle, China sees as a threat against national security tread to its territorial integrity.

6. Uyghurs in Syria

Chinese government worries about the Syrian war from its domestic security aspect. In this context, it is known that some Uyghurs also exist in radical organizations in Syria. One of these organizations is the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) linked to Al-Qaeda. TIP’s activities are located in Syria as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. TIP is also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). TIP is recognized as a terrorist organization by the US and Turkey.[111]

TIP conducted several attacked around the world, some of the recent attacks are mainly; attack a Chinese store in a shopping center in Dubai (2010), Kunming Train Station attack in China (2014), Chinese Bishkek Embassy to China attack (2016). [112]

It’s claimed that a lot of people who joined this organization after leaving China, arrive in Turkey via Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and South Asian countries like Cambodia. From cells in Turkey, they transfer to Syria. [113] In this context, The Times of Israel points, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Turkey and East Turkistan Education and Solidarity Union(ETESA). It is also claimed that some of the allegations received assistance from Turkish representatives in the countries mentioned above.[114]

According to a report published by the Chinese Official News agency, a Uyghur named 'Ekber' in 2013 declared that he was caught by authorities after training in Syria and received explosive training. Base on the same report, in 2011, he went to Syria through TIP and their total number is between 4000 and 5000.[115]

According to official data published by Turkish authorities, 400 Uyghurs were arrested for the reason of attempt to pass the Turkey-Syria border.[116] According to some claims, there is a link between Uyghurs in Syria and the Turkish Intelligence Service.[117] In this context, Turkey expert in the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security in Turkey, Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak claimed that Uyghurs in Syria and Iraq having training by Turkish Intelligence.[118] On the other hand, Sabah Newspaper writer Merve Şebnem Oruç stated that the Uyghurs who went to Syria were sent by Chinese intelligence services; China even provided passports and visas. [119]

The Turkish side denied radical movements in China many times; the main reason is that Turkey’s religious and ethnic ties with Uyghur people and the non-transparent structure of the Chinese government. Once, when the Former Turkish Prime Minister and current President Erdoğan described government measures after ‘Urumqi 7/5 Incident’ as ‘massacre’ against Uyghurs.

Zhu Weilie, an expert at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University, believes that Turkey has double standards in counter-terrorism. “Turkey is against the ‘Islamic State’ but at the same time, it is critical of China’s counter-terrorism policy over Xinjiang. It (Ankara) also shows sympathies with the ‘Uyghur terrorists,’ ‘strengthening counter-terrorism agreement should be the most important part of the Sino-Turkish Relations.” [120] For example, at a press joint conference in 2000, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji highlighted that ‘some extremists from Xinjiang are receiving military training in Afghanistan and some other countries including Turkey, to commit crimes.’[121]

In July 2013, the Chinese Ministry of Counter-Terrorism published a news report that some Chinese citizens have illegally traveled to join extremist groups in Syria via Turkey. [122] In this context, in November 2014, 10 Turkish citizens and group of Uyghurs were arrested in Shanghai Pudong Airport for the reason that Turkish citizens provide fake passports to Uyghurs.[123] This situation reminded Erdoğan’s “Turkey saved 200 Uyghurs from execution in China” words that he said 6 months earlier. Tong Bishan, head of the China Department of Public Security Criminal Studies claimed that Turkish diplomats provided immigration documents to Uyghurs and some Uyghurs were sold to some radical groups as warriors.[124]

It is reported that the vast majority of Uyghurs in Syria are mainly in the Zanbak and Jisr ash-Shugur regions of Idlib.[125] According to Syrian Deputy Fares Shehabi, there are 30-40,000 Uyghurs, Tajik, Uzbek, and Turks other 103 other nations live in Idlib. He stated that most of the warriors came with their families. Shehabi stated that the total number of fighters is about 100,000.[126] American General Joseph Dunford confirmed the situation in Idlib and said that “There are about 20,000 warriors out of civilians,” in Idlib.[127] Additionally, it mentioned that Uyghur kids are receiving ideological education and military training in their communities.[128]

As mentioned, when Turkey conduct ‘Peace Spring Operation’ in northern Syria, China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang highlighted that Turkey’s military action may cause ISIS to rise again.[129] The Chinese side, the main concern is the rise of radical organization which has Uyghur members in it.

In spite of these unpleasant events, Turkey is trying to solve the problem with China, and Beijing is also eager to cooperate with Ankara. In 2016, at Ataturk International Airport, 98 Chinese citizens were arrested by Turkish police for holding counterfeit Kyrgyzstan passports and repatriated to China after handling formalities in the entry and exit administration of Turkey.[130] So, that shows that the Turkish government provides support on this issue. But at the same time, those claims also raise questions about links between those groups and Turkey.

7. NATO, Impact on Turkish and Chinese Relations

NATO established against the Soviet Union in 1949. After the end of the cold war, it reestablished itself against terrorism. NATO changed its duty and geography. As well know, the main purpose of NATO was to protect Europe. Later, NATO extended its mission area to reach central Asia, Afghanistan, and Africa.

In the last NATO summit at London in December 2019, China mentioned for the first time. The importance of this summit is this year is the 70th anniversary of NATO. NATO announced the declaration in its official website, China mentioned as “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance” in London Declaration [131]

US influence on this statement is very clear. The summit held under the atmosphere of ‘Trade War’ between the US and China. US as the biggest influencer and ‘spiritual leader’ of NATO, wants to raise concerns about China’s rise.

China is becoming more and more influential in the fields like economy, space, intelligence, military power and military technology, AI technology and socio-cultural power. Those developments are happening in the developing world and in Europe. That cause potential risk to US cultural and political hegemony around the world.

This new development also analyzed as ‘Cold War 2.0’ by some analysts. According to James Palmer, “There’s been a long-standing debate in the China watcher community over whether the brewing US.-China competition can be called a cold war. But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever accused the other side of causing a pandemic, either deliberately or through neglect. Relations are at their worst point in modern memory and likely only to get worse.” [132]

Many EU countries raise concerns about China’s rise in Continental Europe. Even before the NATO summit, German chancellor Merkel mentioned about the ‘risk’. She offers to have a common policy against China, Russia, and the US. French President Macron offers to have an EU army for the protection of Europe against mentioned forces.[133]

From Turkey's point of view, Turkey already had mentioned issues with China. In the case that NATO forces Turkey to stand against China, most probably Turkey will struggle on those issues. One of the first issues may be the ‘Uyghur Issue’ between the two countries.

US Representative Jim McGovern and US. Senator Marco Rubio, the Chair and Cochair respectively of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), issued action statement for Uyghurs in Xinjiang at April 2019. [134] Later, the US declared that US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin is said to that US will impose sanctions on Chinese officials who involved in internment camps in Xinjiang in June 2019.[135] So it shows that Xinjiang has the potential to be next ‘war front’ between the US and China.

For example, the Spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hami Aksoy made a statement on Uyghurs’ Human Rights issue and internment camps in Xinjiang in February 2019. That was the first time Turkey declared its stance on internment camps. He mentioned that “It is no longer a secret that more than one million Uyghur Turks incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons. Uyghurs who are not detained in these camps are under heavy pressure.” He called the whole situation in Xinjiang is “great shame for humanity.” [136]

After two months, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned that “It is hoped that the Turkish side can also earnestly respect the Chinese side’s core interests in safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and unity, and support the Chinese side in cracking down on the East Turkestan terrorist forces with actions to well safeguard the overall situation of bilateral strategic cooperative relations.” [137]

Turkey showed its stance on the issue at Erdoğan’s visit to China in July again. Erdoğan expressed that he wishes people in China would “live happily in peace and prosperity” but Chinese state media mistranslated President Erdoğan’s words as “People in Xinjiang live happily.” [138]

Another development is that Turkey also declared its stance on the internment camps in the international platform in October 2019. Turkey's Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Varlı said that he already contacted Chinese authorities. He mentioned Turkey’s expectations regarding the guarantee of peace, prosperity, and equality of Uyghurs in China.[139]

Another issue is the ‘Liaoning Crisis’. Liaoning (Varyag) is a Soviet-made aircraft carrier. It purchased under a private Chinese company to convert into a floating hotel and casino in 1997.[140] After the purchase of the aircraft, the company wants to sail it through Bosphorus strait, which is the only exit of the Black sea. Turkish authorities denied this request for the security of the narrow Bosphorus strait as well as the pressure from its western allies. Although it bought for the purpose of tourism it was still an aircraft carrier. After waited 16 months in the Black Sea, Turkish authorities let it pass the Bosphorus strait in the return of 1 million Chinese tourist visits to Turkey in 2001. This delay became a problem between the two countries.[141]

Turkey’s those kinds of statements have domestic and international motivations. Besides domestic motivations, Turkey's international motivations are being a responsible country on human rights and being the voice of ‘subdued Muslim’ around the world. Moreover, as mentioned Turkish foreign policy always has the tendency to follow its policies that popular among its western allies.

In another word, it may easily have the influence of NATO or the US in the case that Turkey fell to pressure from them. It’s important to remember that those statements express under the atmosphere of the ‘Trade War’. Moreover, Turkey already felt pressure on ‘Priest Brunson and Lira Currency Crisis’, Russian Air Defense System S-400, recognition ofso-called “Armenian Genocide”, removal from F-35 aircraft project, US pressure on Eastern Mediterranean Sea, YPG problem in Syria and now Turkey is still feeling pressure on ‘Halkbank Case’. So, those factors may be one reason that Turkey follows US oriented policy on China. It’s important to remember that US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo is the same person that had a speech on Uyghurs; declared a new ‘war front’ on Uyghurs in China and warned Turkey on mentioned issues between Turkey and US.[142] Pompeo said that “China is home to one of the worst human rights crises of our time; it is truly the stain of the century,” about the camps in Xinjiang.[143]

According to two important Turkey experts in China, Dr. Sun Degang and Dr. Zou Zhiqiang, NATO has a huge impact on Turkish foreign policy as well as Turkey-China Relations. As stated by Dr.Sun, “NATO-Turkey relations will always affect Turkey-China relations. For example, China once planned to export the Chinese HQ-9 Air Defense, NATO opposed it and deal ultimately failed.” [144] According to Dr. Zou Zhiqiang, I think NATO has influence on Turkey. NATO is an important bridge between Turkey and the western world. NATO has huge impact on Turkey’s foreign policy that restricting Turkey’s diplomatic choices. It has to affect China-Turkey relations as well.[145]

At this point, Turkish scholar Altay Atli says, “We are not in the Cold War anymore, we are living in a global economy right now. Turkey is not the only one who has ties with China, the US has closer economic and cultural ties then Turkey.” [146] A Turkish diplomat who had working experience in China says “NATO does not have any influence on Turkish-Chinese Relations.” [147] Turkish-Chinese relations not only based on Turkish foreign policy, Turkey as long-term NATO members may face rejection of the Chinese side. Those interviews also show that Chinese and Turkish sides have different point on NATO influence.

On the other hand, some groups like the Patriotic Party which know with its close ties with Russia and China claimed that Turkey is not with old allies anymore. China representative of the Patriotic Party and Turkish-Chinese Business Association President, Adnan Akfirat mentioned that “Turkey left Atlantic block” at 2019 4th Maritime Silk Road International Think-Tank Forum in China. He mentioned that “as a result of 70 (67*) years of NATO membership Turkey's territorial integrity and economy endanger now. Turkey’s military actions blow US forces in Syria. Turkey’s future with Asian countries.” [148] However, Chinese scholars still believe that NATO has a huge influence on Turkey. According to People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Foreign Language Institute Researcher, Li Yunpeng, in the case that China and the US have conflict, Turkey does not really have free space to extend its cooperation with China.[149]

Turkish Chinese Relations are fragile, pragmatic win-win and transactional, relations. Mutual ties have no intuitional strategic dimension. Therefore, it's hard to maintain as stable as other countries. Two countries need to work hard to build new joint platforms to improve relations and solve the mentioned problems.

8. Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to assess the validity of the future of Turkey-China Relations. Turkish Foreign Policy became the question of “Old Wine in New bottle”? But current development shows that Turkish foreign policy having a multidimensional foreign policy. That pushes Turkey to improve its cooperation with other countries. Moreover, Turkey shows its reaction when its national interest faces risk. It sometimes appears as ‘bluff’ or as a shape of ‘hard power’ as explained in the paper with example. By analyzing Turkey’s foreign policy, the paper focused on plenty of variables. The paper uses the Historical Approach, Field Research, and Case study methods to prove its arguments. As an example, after Prime Minister Ecevit’s China visit in 1998, he interviewed by a journalist with the question of “Has Turkey turned its direction to the east”. Ecevit's answer was “World is not confined to Europe for Turkey. People of Turkey and Turkey is in the process of rediscovering its own roots.” [150] It shows that from the 1990s to now, it’s a question mark, but eventually, nothing really changed.

In short, the current Turkish foreign policy follows a pragmatic form of cooperation with China while playing its traditional geostrategic role. It is no coincidence in this regard that Turkey set its foreign policy in this way. Currently, the ultimate goal of Turkish Foreign Policy has become balancing power in the multi-polar world system. Therefore, Turkey is looking for maximum benefit in its limited diplomacy area. Turkey is cherry-picked from the options so that’s one of the reasons why Turkey is approaching China. Although the literature on Turkey-China Relations is enormous, much of it does not address the questions identified here. It hopes that this research will help to fill the research gap.

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